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Introduction
The standard ingredients of a two-person bargaining problem are: & feasible set, S, which is a subset of R2 and a disagreement point (or a threat point), d e S. The interpretation is that the two players are free to cooperate and choose any point x = (xlyx2) € S, where xf denotes the amount of utility that player i gets; but if they fail to cooperate then the players get d, that is, player 1 gets dx utils and 2 gets d2 utils.
It is reasonable to suppose that there will exist such a well-defined point like the disagreement point in all bargaining situations? In the early formulations, like that of Edgeworth (1881), where players were assumed to have initial endowments of goods and could fall back on these if their bargains failed, the answer to this equation may have been a yes. But the Edgeworth formulation is not the only one.
In the modern approach, based on Nash's (1950) agenda, the bargaining problem is often thought of as one deriving from a standard normal-form game. The feasible set S is then simply the feasible set of payoffs of the underlying normal-form game, A part of this work was done while I was a visitor at the University of Stockholm. For valuable discussions and comments I am grateful to T.C.A. Anant, Salvador Barbera, Bhaskar Dutta, Efe Ok, Jörgen Weibull and an anonymous referee of this journal. The paper also benefited from a presentation at the Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi. In any case it seems reasonable to allow for the possibility that in the event of a breakdown in bargaining there may exist a set of disagreement points and it may not be possible to attach probabilities to the elements in the set Hence, in this paper, bargaining games are described by two sets: S, the set of feasible payoffs, and T, the threat set. Solution concepts for such games are derived axiomatically. In selecting axioms concerning the responsiveness of the solution to changes in the threat set T, I draw on the literature on extending a binary relation over a set to a binary relation over the power set ofthat set (see, for example, Kannai and Peleg 1984; Barbera and Pattanaik 1984) . This literature is used to extract axioms for the present context in Sect. 3. Some of the results presented in Sect. 3 may be of interest, independently of this paper, in the context of the literature on ranking sets of alternatives.
Section 2 introduces the notation and preliminary axioms. In Sect. 4 a solution for bargaining games called the max-max solution is defined and axiomatized. An alternative axiomatization for the max-max solution is derived in Sect. 5.
One important kind of bargaining game is a (T, S) such that T = S. We call this a bargaining game with "complete uncertainty". In such a game, if the bargain fails, the players simply know that anything can happen. This would be reasonable if, for instance, in the underlying strategic form game the "minimal tight curb set" is the set of all strategies. The max-max solution unfortunately cannot always be applied to such games where the threat set coincides with the feasible set. (The reason for this will be clear from Sects. 2 and 3.) In Sect. 5, a solution concept called the rectangular general solution is introduced, and axiomatized. This solution gives us Set-valued disagreement 63 a way for splitting payoff betwe uncertainty.
Notation and preliminary axioms
Let Z be the collection of all non-empty compact subsets of R2. For all S e Z, we define 1 -minS:= min{xi |(xi,x2) g S, for some x2}, 2-minS:= min{x2|(x1,x2) s S, for some Xi} 1-maxS and 2-max S are defined likewise.
If S g Z, the rectangular hull of S, denoted by H(S), is the smallest set containing S, which is a Cartesian product of two intervals. Thus
A general bargaining game is an ordered pair (T9S) such that T,S s Z, S is convex and T a S. To start with, however, I shall focus on a slightly less general bargaining game, which will be referred to simply as a "bargaining game". A bargaining game is a general bargaining game, (T,S), such that H(T) e S. Let Q be the collection of all bargaining games. A solution is a mapping/: ft -+ R2 such that, for all (T,S) e ft, f(T9S) = (fi(T,S), f2(T,S)) g S. An important subclass of Q is ñ = {(T,S) g ft | T is a singleton}.
A bargaining game that belongs to ft will be referred to as a traditional bargaining game since the Nash bargaining problem belongs to this class.
Here is some more notation which is used below. For all x,y e R2, The next three axioms are standard.
Axiom P (Pareto). For all (T,S)eÙ, there does not exist y e S such that y>f(T,S).
Axiom S (Symmetry). Define a function h : Z -+ Z such that, for all S e Z, /i(5) = {(x1,x2)gR2|(x2,x1)6S}. The next axiom is that of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) . It is possible to use, instead, Nash's axiom of "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives". This is discussed in Sect. 4. Given that we are currently using the Kalai-Smorodinsky framework, it is possible for us to take advantage of this and to relax the convexity requirement of the feasible set in bargaining games, as in Anant et al. (1990) or Conley and Wilkey (1989) . Up to here everything is standard and makes no use of the fact that ou disagreement "point" is not a point at all but a set. In choosing axioms characterize the effect of changes in the disagreement or threat set on the soluti I draw on the literature which considers the problem of deriving an agent preference over sets of alternatives, given a prespecified preference over the alte tives (see, e.g., Barbera et al. 1987) . I use these ideas to derive preferences over thr sets for each player and then impose an axiom that if both agents find T an equally good then a change of the threat set from T to T does not change the valu of the solution. But before getting to that we need an interlude on ranking sets o alternatives.
Then for all (T,S) e ÙJ(h(T)MS)) = h({f(T,S)}).

Axiom M (Monotonirity
Ranking sets of alternatives
This section may be read independently of the previous ones.
Let U be the universal set of alternatives and let V be the set of all non-empty subsets of U. Let R be an ordering over U and ^ a quasi-ordering (i.e. a reflexive and transitive binary relation) over V. The next three properties capture the idea that > is, in some sense, generated by R. In what follows the asymmetric and symmetric parts of R are denoted by P and / and the asymmetric and symmetric parts of ^ are denoted by > and ~. Hence A -g(A) u l(A). In brief, this establishes that, for all X g V, with nonempty g(X) and l(X), X~g(X)ul(X).
Next, observe that an immediate implication of Property 2 is the followin which will be referred to as: Lemma 3. IfU consists of at least four strictly ranked elements (in terms ofR), then there is no quasi-ordering ^ satisfying Properties 1, 2, 2* and 3.
Proof. Assume ^ is a quasi-ordering satisfying properties 1, 2, 2* and 3 and that x,y,z,weU and xPy, yPz, zPw. By Property 1, {y} > {z}. By property 2*, {x,y,w}>{x,z,w}. But since g({x,y, w}) = g({x,z, w}) = x and J({x,y,w}) = /({x,z, w}) = z, and we know from Lemma 1 that all > satisfying Properties 1-3, would declare such states as equally good, we have {x,y,w} ~{x,z,w}. This contradiction establishes the non-existence of > . D
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We now proceed to use the ideas the effect of changes in threat set
4. An axiomatization of the 'max-max' solution For all i e {1,2}, let Rt be the following binary relation on R2. For all x,y e IR2, xRy <-+ x¡ > y i where x = (xu x2) and y = (yl9 y 2). The next axiom asserts that if the threat set changes from T to T but both players find T and T' equally desirable, then the value of the solution must not change.
Axiom T (Threat invariance). If (7,5), (T',S) e Sì are such that, for all i e {1,2}, and for all quasi-order, ^f, generated by Rh T >¡T' and T ^,T, then/(T, S) = f(T'S).
The next axiom is motivated by the fact that the threat set is likely to be the set of payoffs the players earn from rationalizable solutions (Bernheim 1984; Pearce 1984) or from curb solutions (Basu and Weibull 1991) . Súpose the only two payoffs that occur from the rationalizable solutions of a normal-form game are x = {xu x2) and y = {yl9y2) where x > y. That is, in normal-form game, if s is a strategy pair which is rationalizable and /7, is player fs payoff function, then (ili (5), n2(s)) is either equal to x or y. And for each x and y, there exists a rationalizable strategy pair, s, such that (II '(s' n2(s)) is equal to it. It is arguable that if the two players find that their bargains fail and they have to play this game noncooperatively, then they will expect a payoff of x. That is, x is in some sense "focal" within the set of payoffs possible under rationalizable solutions. In further support of this, check
that if x and y are the only two payoffs that occur from rationalizable solutions and x > y, then there must exist a Nash equilibrium s*, which gives a payoff of x and there does not exist a Nash equilibrium which Pareto dominates 5*. This is what motivates our next axiom. The next section shows how this axiom may be circumvented, should one be so inclined.
Axiom F (Focal point). If ({x,y},S) e iì and x > y, then f({x,y},S) =/({x},S).
Call a solution,/ a max-max solution if, for all (T,S) e Q, f(T,S) is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution of the bargaining game ({1-maxT, 2-maxT)},5). More formally let (T,S)efi. Define S:= {x g S'x £ (1-maxT, 2-maxT)} and L as the set containing all convex combinations of (1-maxT, 2-maxT) and
(1 -max 5, 2 -max S). If/is a max-max solution then/(T, S) is x e L n S such that, for all y e L n 5, x > y. Figure 1 illustrates a max-max solution. Proof. Let / be a solution satisfying axiom /, P, S, A, M , T and F. Consider (T, S) e fi. Let > , be a quasi-ordering generated by JR¡, where (as before) we define R¡ as follows. For all x, y e R2, xR(y «-► x, ^ y¡. From Lemma 1 we know that, for all X, ycR2, X -,y if 1-maxX = l-maxY and l-minX = l-min7. It Define x:=(l-max7' 2-maxT) and y:=(l-minT, 2-minT). Clearly H({x,y}) = H(T). Hence, the observation in the above paragraph and axiom T imply f({x,y},S)=f{T,S). In the light of axiom F this implies, /({x, y },S) =/({x},S).
Hence f(T,S) = /({(l-maxr, 2-max 7)},S). The method of this proof makes it clear that if axiom M were replaced with the axiom of "independence of irrelevant alternatives", R, as defined below, then we could get the "max-Nash solution": The solution/is max-Nash if, for all (T, S) g ft, /(7'S) is the Nash-bargaining solution of ({(1-maxT, 2-maxT)}, S).
Axiom R (Independence of irrelevant alternatives): Let ({d},S), ({d},S)Gft. If S'a S and/({d},S) e S', then /({<*}, S') =f({d},S).
Hence now we have the following theorem, which, being an analogue of Theorem 1, will not be proved here. It is however not clear to me that (1,3) is a reasonable expectation in the event of disagreement, because this requires 2 to expect that player 1 will play 17 with probability '. But since in the Nash equilibrium, player 1 will be indifferent between U and D, there seems little ground to believe that 1 will mix U and D in proportions j and '. This is one of the main problems that motivate the solution concept, curb, examined in Basu and Weibull (1991) . In game G, curb coincides with rationalizability and predicts that any thing in ABCD can happen. It seems right, therefore, to claim that the best way to analyse the cooperative solution of G is to assume that ABCD is both the feasible set and the disagreement set.
Of course there may be other games where the disagreement set may reasonably be taken to consist of a unique point. The advantage of the solution concept I am about to describe and axiomatize is that it can solve both these kinds of bargaining games.
Return to the analysis of Sect. 3. As before, let U be the set of alternatives, V := 2U'{(/)}, R an ordering over U and > a quasi-ordering over V. The asymmetric and symmetric parts of these relations are denoted by the usual notation. Consider the following new properties. We shall now analyse the consequence of adding Properties 4 and 5 to Properties 1-3. Of course there are other properties, especially those which are symmetric to Properties 4 and 5 which look as appealing as Properties 1-5.
I shall comment on some of these later but in the meantime, Properties 4 and 5 do look reasonable requirements, the consequences of which ought to be examined.
Let us return to the bargaining problem. Let Q* be the set of all general bargaining games. A general solution is a mapping f:il* -+ R2 such that, for all (T,S) e Q*,/(r,S).-= (/i(T,5), /2(7'S)) g S. Clearly, if/is a general solution, the restriction of/ to Í2, is a solution.
